Historical examples of decentralized organization: Difference between revisions
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This page collects historical examples of groups which organized without central authorities | This page collects historical examples of groups which organized without central authorities. The goal is to study the common patterns that emerge in such situations. The successes and failures of previous efforts give valuable lessons for future DAOs, indicating wise practices in developing legal principles and standards for cultivating ethics in order to create stability and longevity. | ||
A common pattern in the emergence of decentralized organization is often an abundance of resources, for instance, geography in the cases of nomadic steppes tribes or maritime republics. | A common pattern in the emergence of decentralized organization is often an abundance of resources, for instance, geography in the cases of nomadic steppes tribes or maritime republics. Another situation that generates the conditions for decentralized organization is oppression, in the cases of the Maghribi traders and rebel groups such as pirates and religious orders. | ||
== Nomads == | == Nomads == | ||
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== Maghribi traders == | == Maghribi traders == | ||
Jewish merchant network in the 11th century Silk Road. | Jewish merchant network in the 11th century Silk Road. | ||
Papers by [http://www.stanford.edu/~avner/ Avner Greif] are particularly relevant to DGF, since they directly discuss the theory of repeated games and reputation: | |||
* 1993 | * Avner Greif (1993) "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition" American Economic Review, Vol. 83(3): 525-48. | ||
* Avner Greif (1992, May) "Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution." American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No.2, pp. 128-133. | |||
* 1992 | * Avner Greif (1989) "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders" Journal of Economic History, XLIX, pp. 857-82. Also of interest is a four year debate about the issues <nowiki>https://web.stanford.edu/~avner/greif-debate.html</nowiki> | ||
* 1989 | |||
== Peasant republics == | == Peasant republics == | ||
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== Hanseatic League == | == Hanseatic League == | ||
The [[wikipedia:Hanseatic_League|Hanseatic League]] was a loose confederation of trading bodies which emerged in Germany in the middle ages. | The [[wikipedia:Hanseatic_League|Hanseatic League]] was a loose confederation of trading bodies which emerged in Germany in the middle ages. | ||
* Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, & Barry Weingast (1994) “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 745-776. | |||
== Thassalocracies == | == Thassalocracies == | ||
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Another interesting example is the hypothesized [[wikipedia:Sea_Peoples|Sea Peoples]], claimed as a reason for the [[wikipedia:Late_Bronze_Age_collapse|Bronze Age Collapse]]. | Another interesting example is the hypothesized [[wikipedia:Sea_Peoples|Sea Peoples]], claimed as a reason for the [[wikipedia:Late_Bronze_Age_collapse|Bronze Age Collapse]]. | ||
== Religious orders == | |||
* [[wikipedia:Quaker_business_method|Quaker deliberation]] | |||
* [[wikipedia:Monastic_community_of_Mount_Athos|Monastic Community of Mount Athos]] | |||
* Judaic diaspora | |||
* Islam | |||
* | |||
Latest revision as of 01:55, 1 May 2023
This page collects historical examples of groups which organized without central authorities. The goal is to study the common patterns that emerge in such situations. The successes and failures of previous efforts give valuable lessons for future DAOs, indicating wise practices in developing legal principles and standards for cultivating ethics in order to create stability and longevity.
A common pattern in the emergence of decentralized organization is often an abundance of resources, for instance, geography in the cases of nomadic steppes tribes or maritime republics. Another situation that generates the conditions for decentralized organization is oppression, in the cases of the Maghribi traders and rebel groups such as pirates and religious orders.
Nomads[edit | edit source]
Loads of examples from the steppes--from the Mongols to the Roma--to the North American plains Indians.
Maghribi traders[edit | edit source]
Jewish merchant network in the 11th century Silk Road.
Papers by Avner Greif are particularly relevant to DGF, since they directly discuss the theory of repeated games and reputation:
- Avner Greif (1993) "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition" American Economic Review, Vol. 83(3): 525-48.
- Avner Greif (1992, May) "Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution." American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No.2, pp. 128-133.
- Avner Greif (1989) "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders" Journal of Economic History, XLIX, pp. 857-82. Also of interest is a four year debate about the issues https://web.stanford.edu/~avner/greif-debate.html
Peasant republics[edit | edit source]
Peasant republics have emerged in various agrarian areas throughout history when monarchies are weak in particular areas.
Hanseatic League[edit | edit source]
The Hanseatic League was a loose confederation of trading bodies which emerged in Germany in the middle ages.
- Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, & Barry Weingast (1994) “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 745-776.
Thassalocracies[edit | edit source]
Thassalocracies often emerge first as decentralized groups which find common purpose in creating security and stability for trade on the ocean.
Greek democracies[edit | edit source]
The Delian league ...
Maritime republics[edit | edit source]
Maritime republics emerged in the Mediterranean during the Middle ages.
Pirate confederacies[edit | edit source]
Pirate confederacies would often take particularly democratic forms of government. This was especially evident during the Golden Age of Piracy in the Caribbean preceding the foundation of the United State of America. The pirate code was based on a previous maritime law, the Rôles d´Oléron, (detailed here) from the 12th century.
Another interesting example is the hypothesized Sea Peoples, claimed as a reason for the Bronze Age Collapse.
Religious orders[edit | edit source]
- Quaker deliberation
- Monastic Community of Mount Athos
- Judaic diaspora
- Islam