Historical examples of decentralized organization: Difference between revisions
(Created page with "This page collects historical examples of groups which organized without central authorities emerging in order to study the common patterns that emerge in such situations. The successes and failures of previous groups give valuable lessons for future DAOs, indicating wise practices in developing legal principles and standards for cultivating ethics. A common pattern in the emergence of decentralized organization is often an abundance of resources, for instance, geograph...") |
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== Maghribi traders == | == Maghribi traders == | ||
Jewish merchant network in the 11th century Silk Road. | Jewish merchant network in the 11th century Silk Road. | ||
Papers by | |||
Papers by [http://www.stanford.edu/~avner/ Avner Greif]: | |||
* 1994. "Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild. (With P. Milgrom and B. Weingast)." JPE. | * 1994. "Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild. (With P. Milgrom and B. Weingast)." JPE. | ||
Revision as of 21:31, 28 April 2023
This page collects historical examples of groups which organized without central authorities emerging in order to study the common patterns that emerge in such situations. The successes and failures of previous groups give valuable lessons for future DAOs, indicating wise practices in developing legal principles and standards for cultivating ethics.
A common pattern in the emergence of decentralized organization is often an abundance of resources, for instance, geography in the cases of nomadic steppes tribes or maritime republics. Without
Nomads
Loads of examples from the steppes--from the Mongols to the Roma--to the North American plains Indians.
Maghribi traders
Jewish merchant network in the 11th century Silk Road.
Papers by Avner Greif:
- 1994. "Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild. (With P. Milgrom and B. Weingast)." JPE.
- 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition." American Economic Review, Vol. 83(3): 525-48
- 1992. "Instuitions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution." American Economic Review.
- 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders." JEH.
- 2008. On contract Enforcement and Institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie."
Peasant republics
Peasant republics have emerged in various agrarian areas throughout history when monarchies are weak in particular areas.
Hanseatic League
The Hanseatic League was a loose confederation of trading bodies which emerged in Germany in the middle ages.
Thassalocracies
Thassalocracies often emerge first as decentralized groups which find common purpose in creating security and stability for trade on the ocean.
Greek democracies
The Delian league ...
Maritime republics
Maritime republics emerged in the Mediterranean during the Middle ages.
Pirate confederacies
Pirate confederacies would often take particularly democratic forms of government. This was especially evident during the Golden Age of Piracy in the Caribbean preceding the foundation of the United State of America. The pirate code was based on a previous maritime law, the Rôles d´Oléron, (detailed here) from the 12th century.
Another interesting example is the hypothesized Sea Peoples, claimed as a reason for the Bronze Age Collapse.