Editing Validation Pool roll up (section)

=== Tokenomics calculations ===
To guarantee the incentives are correct, the rollup team should not be able to collude to gain more REP salary fees by violating the process than they could by participating faithfully in the long run. One way a team could violate the process is to give themselves more of the REP than they deserve. For instance, there is no way to prevent a colluding team from censoring other DAO participants. (''Censorship'' is a well-known problem in decentralized computing, especially in block production consensus mechanism research. An example of censorship is that the team might ignore messages from other members who were voting in the VP policing instantiations. That would make the team's REP larger than it should be if they faithfully ran the roll up.) Therefore, the amount of fees that are handled by a team should not give policing REP from the VP instantiations for their week which have greater present value than the expected rREP salaries of an rWorker. This [[Reputation tokenomics|tokenomics calculation]] is affected by the measured safety the zk proofs guarantee, meaning the likelihood of the colluding team to be slashed instead of rewarded for Byzantine behavior.