Editing Validation Pool roll up (section)

=== Judicial governance ===
For security, to disincentivize Byzantine behavior, perpetual review should be possible for each roll up.

DGF naturally includes the [[Executive governance|executive review]] of each roll up via the rValidation Pool for each rWSC. rValidation Pools police the rWorkers automatically before they receive their new rREP for successful work, and also threaten the slashing of rWorkers' availability stakes rREP if they do not follow protocol.

To greater incentivize faithful execution of roll ups, rWorkers' rREP can be tied together, since there is a record of the history of all newly minted rREP in the Validation Pool which is connected to the previous rREP that the rWorker encumbered in the rASC that was selected by the rWSC. Therefore the entire history of all the rWorker's rREP is subject to automatic slashing if they exhibit Byzantine behavior that violates the current protocols for roll-up work.

However, there will still inevitably be a perpetual arms race for finding ways to game the system. Regardless of how carefully the protocols are written, there is always a way to profit at the expense of the larger group while following the letter of the law (see [[Transcendent values#Game theory argument|game theory argument]]). So it is possible that the DAO would wish to slash rREP even if the Validation Pool didn't automatically catch such second-order Byzantine behavior.

Therefore, it is essential that all rREP be subject to future judicial review if it is ever suspected that an rWorker has violated the values of the group and harmed the DAO. This type of judicial policing is enabled by implementing DGF's [[judicial governance]] protocols. In particular, the DAO should implement standardized [[Judicial governance proposal|judicial proposals]] to slash Byzantine members' rREP, and meaningfully motivate such proposals by paying for them with a percentage of the rREP that is slashed.