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=== Automated optimal actions === A sophisticated cfDAO will make the numerical decisions automatic. This is because there are optimal actions based on the subscriber's goals. For example, if the subscriber wishes to use the chit fund as an investment, then the proper bid in any round is given by the formula <math>$\Bigl(Np+\tfrac{F-Np}{T-i+1}\Bigr) </math>. The notation is explained next with a justification for the formula. Denote the number of rounds in the chit fund as <math>T</math>. The current stage is <math>i</math>. The premium is <math>$p</math>. The number of subscribers is <math>N</math>. (In the basic chit fund <math>N=T</math>.) At each stage <math>i</math> the subscribers add <math>$Np</math> to the fund <math>$F_i</math> so at each stage <math>$F_i \geq $Np</math>. Note that if two or more subscribers have not bid on the fund by the final round, then they split the fund equally. Assuming the interest rate is positive, <math>$x</math> is worth more than <math>$x</math> in the future. Consider the case when there are two bidders who wish to maximize their earnings from the chit fund who are the only ones left to bid in the second to last round. As a rational bidder you should accept <math>$\Bigl(Np+\tfrac{F-Np}{2}\Bigr) </math> on the second to last round, because otherwise you split the same amount later in the final round. So you might as well accept that number earlier. If your opponent underbids you, then you will receive more on the final round. However if you do not bid that low, then your opponent can bid slightly higher than that, diminishing your rewards on the final round. Similar logic applies to the preceding rounds, giving the optimal strategy for an investor is to bid <math>$\Bigl(Np+\tfrac{F-Np}{T-i+1}\Bigr) </math> at stage <math>i</math>. For example, if everyone is going to save money the entire time, it's better to get out of the chit fund if you are planning on investing, in order to join another fund that has members who ''are'' seeking loan opportunities. So you should always bid <math>$Np</math> on the first round and get out if no one bids low.
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