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== Transcendent Values Thesis == No formal rules for a group's membership and behavior can be made which prevents adversaries from violating the intent of the framers, corruptly profiting at the expense of the majority, while following the rules. Therefore, the ultimate rules that govern a group should not be explicitly stated. The highest rules should be vague, but pointing as directly as possible to some common values that transcend formal description. More simply, the Transcendent Values Thesis is: ''For the long-term stability of an organization, the spirit of the law is more important than the letter of the law.'' === Game theory evidence === In any slightly complicated repeated game, like Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in real life, no static set of formal rules exist which guarantee everyone will get a fair reward. No matter the strategy of the rule framers, there is another strategy that an adversary can discover, likely more complicated, which will gain profit for them at the expense of the group. [[wikipedia:Folk_theorem_(game_theory)|The Folk Theorems of game theory]] give motivation for such claims. In each game that is as complicated as the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find an infinitude of strategies that give Nash Equilibria. And there are infinitely many variations on the Prisoner's Dilemma that give sub-game perfect strategies, including assumptions such as * whether the players can communicate * whether policing deviations from the rules is costly to the group * whether information about a player’s history or reputation is available to the group * stochastic variations ** “trembling hand” ** imperfect reporting of results ** imperfect memory of the past However, any real-life situation is infinitely more complex than any mathematically formalized game. And the motivations of each player ultimately transcend any formalization. Desires change as soon as a rule does. So we expect there to be infinitely many successful strategies for any real-life contest. No static set of rules will be able to prevent a player from exploiting those rules for their corrupt profit at the expense of the group. === What is a thesis? === The Transcendent Values Thesis is a thesis and not a theory or theorem, because it is not a logical statement; it cannot be formally proven or disproven. A thesis, in mathematics or philosophy, is a claim that transcends the ability of your current logical system to describe formally. The reason the Transcendent Values Thesis is a thesis, is that it is pointing toward the situation that people playing a complicated game are capable of having desires and intentions that violate the expectations of the framers of the rules of the game. So the framers' intentions can always be subverted. The idea of fairness in a game is dependent on the framers' intentions, which precede and transcend the rules. === Consequences === ==== Blockchain architecture ==== Consensus mechanisms for block production, such as Proof of Stake (PoS), are directly affected by the Transcendent Values Thesis. A PoS algorithm relies on a decentralized network of nodes to follow protocols and check that the other nodes are also following those protocols for constructing new blocks of data. However, there is always leeway in how a node produces a new block, which gives opportunities for corruption. For instance, the consensus mechanism exists to create a canonical view of the network, periodically. The issue is that there is no natural canonical view. Each node has a different perspective, for instance, on the issue of the chronology of messages in the gossip network. How does the network decide which transaction was uploaded first when two messages are sent to two different nodes within the latency period of communication between those nodes. Therefore, one of the functions of block production is to artificially create a canonical view of the gossip network, at successive periods in time. Censorship is also a major difficulty, where a block producer might choose to ignore certain messages and not include certain transactions in their new block. As a simple example, a block producer could arbitrage their network power by purchasing a stock for a lower price than was bid by a user that the block producer chooses to censor. Then the block producer can sell the stock to the bidder for the higher price, making a guaranteed personal profit at the expense of the market. In this situation, block production entails complicated rules for a repeated game. The Transcendent Values Thesis claims it is not possible to create an algorithm that will prevent every possible approach to subverting the intentions of the algorithm's designers to prevent [[Corruption|corrupt behavior]]. Therefore there is an inevitable arms race between the architects who must make ever more complicated algorithms, against potential or actual corruptors who will find ways to profit unfairly by gaming the system. The best way to escape this arms race is by giving the potential corruptors incentives to improve the algorithm rather than exploit it. For this, the blockchain platform needs a system of governance sophisticated enough to effectively reward such behavior and punish exploitation. This motivates DGF: ==== DAO design ==== The Transcendent Values Thesis (TVS) motivates the creation of [[DAO Governance Framework|DGF]] as informs its design. It requires us to create a system of [[governance]] for any slightly sophisticated DAO, assuming we cannot engineer some perfect protocols that can anticipate all future market behaviors. TVS requires this system of governance to be fundamentally flexible, incorporating eternal evolution as a basic assumption. It requires review as a basic mechanism, assuming whatever protocols have been instantiated in the past will be insufficient to guarantee uniformly healthy and helpful contributions throughout time. Therefore we instantiate [[Judicial governance|judicial]] governance mechanisms for reviewing past actions and [[Legislative governance|legislative]] governance mechanisms for reviewing the very protocols for reviewing past actions. Judicial protocols such as [[Forum reference mechanisms|references]], which reward posts that improve the platform or punish participation that later is deemed to be harmful to the platform, can motivate potential corruptors to instead create improved policing mechanisms. At the very least, when the incentives are insufficient to prevent such Byzantine behavior, the judicial reference mechanisms can correct the consequences of the corrupt behavior, stabilizing the function of the platform. ==== Religion ==== The Transcendental Values Thesis gives academic justification for the necessity of the existence of religions, which are universal throughout human groups. For long-term stability and integrity, groups need to share common values which are beyond the ability of rigorous symbols to formally capture with logical strictures for behavior. The thesis also explains the failure of any formal religion to be universal and eternal. Religions entail formal protocols for behavior, i.e., ceremonies and rituals. Their centralized protocols lead to hierarchies of power which are then gamed, corrupting and destabilizing the group. Therefore religions inevitably collapse under such destabilizing internal competition. Therefore the protocols of a long-term stable religion require transcendent principles--principles which transcend any formal description. The experience of transcendent values are of a "know-it-when-you-see-it" nature. We cannot define absolute good, but we recognize what is good and bad when we are honest and observant.
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