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== Applications == Major applications of BOND tokens include incentivizing future work through bounties, attracting investors, or transparently broadcasting the future power of founders. BOND tokens can also be used to make algorithmically controlled [[Stable coin governance|stable coins]]. They are also the basis of decentralized markets in REP tokens, created for example to help workers [[Graceful Exit BOND market|exit a DAO gracefully]], or to create a pillar for decentralized underwriting. * Dev bounties * [[Investor bonds]] * Founder bonds * [[Decentralized underwriting|Insurance DAOs]] ** [[Decentralized underwriting#Insurance DAO protocols|REP-to-BOND market]] * Governance bonds * [[Treasury|Treasuries]] * [[Stable coin governance|Stable coins]] * [[Graceful Exit BOND market]] * [[Financial derivatives]] ** calls ** puts ?? To Do: · Make formula for Early Investor BONDs vs. Founder BONDs vs workers who take advantage of the DAO’s systems the Investors and Founders created. o Investors Tokens given above o Founders deserve some percentage of the profit and power created. This is transparently broadcast. The Founder BONDs § pay off at a certain later date § can be directly dependent on the amount of profits the DAO achieves § can be inversely dependent on the amount of further founder work that is done—meaning there could be a fixed percentage of Founder % of all future profits for a fixed period of time (possibly infinity, or it can attenuate) o Example, how do we give ourselves power in the DGF? o Workers receive o Governance tokens. Controlling equity that has independent amounts of power in 1. the reputational salary, and 2. Governance decisions. We may think of these tokens as “hegemony stocks” in the case that they are programmed to maintain power for their owners independently of how power is redistributed through other means. That is, hegemony stocks can be designed which maintain for their owners a fixed minimum percentage of governance power, with any programmed We may think of these as pure governance tokens o All these parameters can be subject to evolution. I.e., they are optimized across multiple DAOs, who all argue and experiment about what the best parameters are for fair reward of founder work. They want to give what is appropriate; not too much, not too little. But the answer will be dynamic and will obviously depend on the situation. E.g., a DAO that copies another DAO’s foundational structure, shouldn’t pay its founders as much, since they didn’t do as much foundational work. (That DAO should probably pay the other DAO’s founders some amount [smaller than the original DAO paid, though, all things being equal].) ??
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