Editing Reputation

Reputation is a personal judgement based on your past actions. Reputation is an essential component of DAO governance. This page outlines the mechanisms DGF uses to give [[DAO]]<nowiki/>s meaningful and secure reputation tokens, called REP.

When we enter into a business contract, we rely on our counterparty’s reputation to predict how they will act during a transaction, to give us the confidence to enter a bargain. History has repeatedly proven the proper attitude for a healthy market environment is to seek to improve and protect your reputation for the long term, not to simply acquire as much money as possible in a single business deal. A secure and reliable system that accounts for meaningful reputation transforms such zero-sum competitive behavior concerned with immediate profits into an environment which motivates future-oriented, sustainable cooperation. When a single game turns into a repeated game, the incentives are transformed. In a system with repeated business, reputation is actually a positive sum quality, since it can be created from nowhere. Whenever two parties behave well and collaborate productively, perhaps sacrificing their own short-term gain on some aspects of the deal, they produce valuable reputation that signals further positive interactions in the future.

How can we foster a culture which respects and values reputation more than money when our DAOs allow pseudonymous members to join or leave at will? It is not a simple task to properly design and program a robust mechanism that is secure against the infinite strategies for gaming our algorithmic reputation system. This page explains how to capture the meaning of genuine reputation with digital REP tokens, analyze the system’s security, specify precisely the economic value of a REP token, and detail important applications.

== REP Token Design?? ==
Reputation is the ideal basis for power in a DAO. When a DAO focuses on immediately fungible cash rewards as its highest goal, then a zero-sum incentive structure is established, which leads to harmful competition that destabilizes the group. When, instead, reputation is the measure of power over decision making, then a positive-sum incentive structure obtains.

When fungible cash is the goal, there is a limited quantity available in any business transaction. In that case, whenever your counterparty competitor gets any of the cash on the table of your business deal, then there is exactly that much less for you to enjoy (zero sum). The fungibility of cash rewards focus the incentives on the present. But the right perspective in good business is to concern yourself with the next transaction and the one after that. When the parties are concerned with business in the future, then the incentives change. When we are focused on creating the opportunities for future business, our concern becomes improving our reputation over our temporary cash total. Reputation is fundamentally different from cash, because reputation is a positive-sum index, not zero-sum. Reputation can be created in the course of any transaction, from nowhere. Positive collaboration leads to increased reputation for both parties. Outsiders can watch the collaboration and gain new respect for both participants, which can lead to future profits. When there is a system for remembering the past behavior of business parties, when there is a system for accounting for reputation, then collaboration becomes a more attractive strategy than competition.

Gaming the system is an ever-present threat to any algorithmic design for representing meaningful reputation. With this in mind, several qualities are necessary for making a secure and meaningful reputation token. The following fundamental mechanism assures many of these qualities.

'''REP Token Minting Mechanism''': Reputation tokens (REP) are minted when a fee is paid to the DAO. Ownership of REP is determined by the work done to earn that fee. The fee is distributed to the entire group, proportionately according to ownership of past REP.

This basic mechanism is the heart of the entire paper. REP tokenomics is primarily the study of the economic consequences of this token minting mechanism, which gives REP tokens for work, delaying the fungible cash money reward and diffusing it to the entire group. To make the process as clear as possible, here is the basic breakdown of a DAO’s workflow:

1.      A public outsider (non-member of the DAO) asks the DAO for work in return for a cash fee.

2.      The DAO chooses a member to do work for the outsider.

3.      The member does the work for the outsider.

4.      Outsider gives the fee to the DAO.

5.      The DAO mints new REP for the worker, if the work was done properly.

6.      The DAO shares the fee with everyone who already has REP.

The fees the DAO earns are not given to the member who did the work to bring in the fee. Instead, the fees are shared with everyone in the DAO, proportional to their REP holdings. This is called the '''REP salary'''. Instead of fees going directly to those who do the work, newly minted REP tokens are given to those workers. Workers only get cash later, when their REP earns parts of fees through the REP salary.

The formulas derived in the next subsection show that, on average, the REP salary eventually pays out the present value of the fees for the work. The system is ultimately fair, since all the profits are shared entirely with the members. The REP salary delays the distribution of the fees, which gives REP tokens some of the meaning of reputation, since they can be slashed if at any point the DAO discovers the actions which earned the REP were harmful to the DAO.

Labeling a digital token to be a REP token does not automatically mean it serves the practical function of genuine reputation. The above mechanism engenders the following six essential qualities which characterize the traditional concept of reputation.

1.      Future orientation

Reputation tokens continue to pay off in the future, whenever anyone from the platform earns fees. This focuses members’ goals toward future productivity, instead of immediate rewards, which incentivizes cooperation. This gives us a signal predicting that a member with high REP will likely continue to behave well in the future.

2.      Solidarity

By sharing the fees with the group, the mechanism encourages '''solidarity'''. Members are not merely incentivized to maximize their personal token holdings, but also to protect the group value of all reputation tokens. The ideal individual strategy is to act so that the group will continue to earn future business.

3.      Decentralization

This mechanism is '''inflationary''', in the economic sense, since new tokens are continually minted whenever the DAO earns profit.[1] This naturally decentralizes power as the total quantity of REP tokens inflates, since any new work from any source will dilute the existing power base.

4.      Meritocracy

The system is entirely '''meritocratic''', since all fees the group earns are distributed to members proportionally to their individual reputation holdings, which are earned only when a member contributes something valuable to the DAO.

5.      Grounding

To guarantee reputation is '''grounded''' in meaning, the only time a REP token is minted is when the DAO gains money from outside the organization, when fees are paid for work done by members. Fungible cash money is thus seen as a mediator of value between different DAO’s REP types, and is a representative of universal energy.

6.      Limited Domain

Different types of work should be given different types of REP tokens. Reputation should represent the history of positive contributions for a specific skill. Every DAO will necessarily entail a complex combination of different expertises. To be able to appropriately and efficiently reward members for their contributions, to allow proper decentralized policing of reputation, multiple incompatible types of REP tokens are needed, one for each expertise the DAO requires to function. For example, every DAO will need help developing the software they use, so devREP is needed that is not interchangeable with the main workREP. A second example every DAO will need is govREP which controls the decisions the DAO makes for how to change the smart contracts they use. Basic workREP, devREP, and govREP each represent non-overlapping expertises. Therefore the tokens for tracking and auditing members’ relative power should also be distinguished. Separate types of tokens are incompatible, in the sense that owning one type of token gives you none of the rights or powers that any other type enjoys. How each type of REP is rewarded will be a continual negotiation.

To guarantee the mechanism for producing REP tokens is successful in representing authentic reputation, two more qualities need to be added:

7.      Non-fungibility

The delay in payouts allows the group to slash any member’s REP holdings if it is discovered the actions which earned any specific REP token were harmful to the DAO. This each token is different from every other, since it is associated with a particular action.

8.      Review

The future orientation and non-fungibility is magnified when combined with a mechanism for slashing or augmenting reputation tokens. REP is reviewable. By allowing separate review of each particular action that earned REP in the past, tokens earned from any specific action are not interchangeable with any other. This review mechanism falls under the topic of judicial governance, discussed below.

These last qualities are not present in the simple REP Token Minting Mechanism described above. We explain how the review mechanism may be implemented in a decentralized manner later, in the section on judicial governance. This judicial branch of governance can be added to the legislative branch with its own decentralized mechanism necessary for instituting an evolutionary structure which converges on ever greater security. 
----[1] It is a security risk for a DAO to print tokens in proportion to revenue instead of profit, since an entity which provides the service is then advantaged over members purely devoted to the DAO’s restricted domain of expertise.